Background
The United States has run generous international food assistance programs -commonly known simply as "food aid" -for more than half a century since President Eisenhower signed the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 (Public Law 480, or PL 480) into law. Emergency food aid is one of several areas of international development assistance that have delivered demonstrably high returns over the years.
U.S. food aid in particular has saved and improved millions of lives over that period and continues to account for half or more of global food aid volumes in any given year. U.S. The pressure for change has built as food aid has evolved dramatically since the 1990
Farm Bill enacted the last major revisions to US food aid policy. Up to that time, generous farm price support programs generated massive government-held stocks of grain, and substantial tariff and non-tariff barriers in farm products and the high cost of international freight and communications limited global commodity trade, relative to current patterns. US food aid programs were designed for those conditions. PL480 offered a means to reduce government stock-carrying expenses by disposing of commodity surpluses beyond the U.S. agricultural marketshed, where it would not to drive down market prices and thereby force additional government procurement under price support programs. At the same time, legislators and program managers hoped that PL480 would yield added dividends in the form of promotion of future commercial agricultural exports, geopolitical support from developing countries, or humanitarian assistance to those suffering poverty and hunger. US food aid programs succeeded at some of these goals, notably in surplus disposal and in providing humanitarian assistance around the world.
Yet, much has changed and those changes fuel calls for substantive reforms to U.S. food aid programs. There remains a real need for food aid because food is an exceptionally effective resource for addressing acute food insecurity in crisis situations, and often an efficient and effective resource for longer-term development programming to prevent food emergencies by supporting carefully targeted interventions -such as maternal and child health or school feeding programs -for which food itself is intrinsically valuable as a resource. In a variety of circumstances -chiefly, in emergency situations in settings where food is extremely scarce and markets do not function well -commodities prove far more valuable than their delivered cost.
Nevertheless, the resource-driven nature of current programs leads to overuse and misuse of food aid, while a range of restrictions on food aid programs that exist purely to build political support for the programs not only waste scarce taxpayer dollars, but also diminish U.S. food aid programs' effectiveness in reducing hunger and human suffering around the world. Abstracted from the politics of Congressional appropriations and agency budgeting, the ideal arrangement might be to end food aid programs altogether and to simply allocate the equivalent amount of cash to international emergency and development assistance programs. After all, these could readily procure commodities and shipping services from the United States when these were the best use of scarce dollars. Given that politics heavily condition actual resource allocation, however, the likelihood of such flexible appropriations and budgeting is virtually nil. Because support for emergency and development assistance remains a high-return investment for the United States, the challenge of food aid reform is thus not to throw the baby out with the bath water.
The complexity of the programs -and especially of the politics surrounding them -and widespread failure to recognize how much has changed since the 1990 Farm Bill limit most legislators' understanding of both the need for reform and of the options available in the 2007 Farm Bill. Opportunities exist for sensible reform. Like any reform, this will take some political courage. This paper is not, however, about the politics of food aid programs. Rather, it is about the economics of food aid programs. And the economic case for food aid reform -not the status quo and not elimination of U.S. international food assistance programs -is overwhelming.
U.S. Food Aid Programs
The U.S. government currently operates seven distinct food aid programs, two of which are presently dormant (Table 1 ). The overwhelming majority of U.S. food aid has always fallen under the three titles of Public Law 480 (PL 480), funded through annual and supplemental appropriations by the Congress and authorized in regular Farm Bills. These are supplemented by two more specialized programs -Food for Progress and the
McGovern-Dole International Food for Education and Child Nutrition program -and the
Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust, a food reserve on which the government can call to respond to emergency food needs in developing countries, all of which are likewise authorized by Farm Bills and covered by annual agriculture appropriations. Furthermore, historically food aid programs often employed commodity donations from Commodity 1 PL480 Title III programs, administered by USAID, donate commodities to developing country governments that then generally sell the food to generate funds to support long-term economic development programs. Title III funding was phased out in 1999, although the Title remains on the books as an unfunded facility that could be used if the Congress appropriated funds for it.
Credit Corporation (CCC) surpluses, which are permanently authorized by Section 416(b) of the Agricultural Act of 1949 and thus do not require renewed Farm Bill authorization. The Bush Administration halted 416(b) food aid has discontinued shipments in recent years, but that can be reversed easily given permanent authorization. shipments received and to use the proceeds for a range of other purposes, typically negotiated in advance with the US government. These programs are explicitly targeted at promoting American agricultural export markets and at advancing U.S. strategic interests.
Because of this trade promotion objective and because the United States is the only major donor that continues to ship food aid on anything other than a completely free ("grant" in development assistance jargon) basis, other agricultural exporters complain that at least the Title I PL480 component of U.S. food aid is a disguised export credit program. 
What Has Changed
With the exception of the modest McGovern-Dole program, all U.S. food aid programs have been in place and largely unchanged for more than 20 years. In the meantime, many changes have occurred in the background conditions that originally informed the design of U.S. food aid programs. Concerns about contemporary U.S. food aid arise in large measure in response to these changes.
A. Price Supports and Disposal of Government Grain Surpluses
For many years, U.S. food aid provided an effective form of surplus disposal. The What has not changed is the widespread but mistaken belief that food aid benefits American farmers financially. The $654 million spent on food aid commodities in fiscal year 2005 is a drop in the ocean of the nearly $1 trillion U.S. food economy and only about 1% of net farm income in the United States. Moreover, the actual crop value is even less than $654 million because statutory requirements for bagging and processing (discussed below) cause a non-trivial portion of that sum to go for post-harvest valueadded activities. Even food aid shipments of wheat, the leading commodity in U.S. food aid programs, represent less than 2% of national wheat production. Food aid programs are simply too small to move market prices for food, even for bulk commodities.
Originally, food aid was the byproduct of (price and income) support to farmers, not the source of such support. So there was a direct correlation between the government boosting farmers' incomes and government shipping food aid abroad. But the causation flowed from the former to the latter, not vice versa. As government price support programs ended and food aid procurement necessarily changed, the historical relation between farm income support and food aid flows broke down.
B. The Commercial Trade Promotion Hypothesis
In 1954, PL480 supporters conjectured that, rather like "try one free" offers by food manufacturers aiming to attract new customers, free food aid might cultivate new consumers for American grown and processed commodities and establish distribution channels necessary to make commercial agricultural exports to nontraditional markets viable. USDA's Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) is therefore charged with responsibility for all food aid programs other than Titles II and III, as they fall under the heading of "Market Development" and "Trade Development" Programs in official government literature.
The intervening fifty-plus years' experience has proved false the hypothesis that food aid would create new commercial markets. The statistical evidence that disentangles changes in recipient countries' commercial agricultural imports that might be attributable to food aid receipts from changes due to other factors such as urbanization, independent income growth, increased recipient country agricultural productivity, etc. finds, perhaps surprisingly, that U.S. food aid reduces, rather than increases, American commercial agricultural exports for 20 years, on average (Barrett, Mohapatra and Snyder 1999) .
Why? The simple reason is that agribusinesses and shippers find it cheaper and easier to sell to the U.S. government than to foreign buyers. The "try one free" metaphor is inappropriate because the vendors never give away the product. They get paid market value (or better) regardless of whether food flows via food aid or commercial trade. And once one controls for other factors at play, food aid does not appear to build up a taste among foreign consumers for U.S. food exports, nor does it stimulate sufficient income growth in recipient markets to induce expansion of commercial import demand that compensates for the commercial imports displaced by free food aid shipments.
Moreover, a considerable body of empirical research has consistently found that food aid can disrupt commercial markets when it is not carefully targeted to food insecure recipients in destination countries. In principle, it can discourage domestic food production by driving down prices, as the Nobel Laureate T.W. Schultz (1960) theorized.
The empirical evidence suggests, however, that food aid displaces little or no domestic food production, on average. Although that most certainly happens in some places, there are also studies that find net positive effects on recipient country agricultural productivity (Abdulai, Barrett and Hoddinott 2005) . Rather, food aid seems mainly to impact commercial imports, especially commercial imports from the donor country but also imports from third countries (Barrett, Mohapatra and Snyder 1999 , OECD 2003 , Lowder 2004 ). This is of course consistent with the simple observation that even poor economies have become reasonably well integrated into global food markets, thus limiting the national-level price effects of food aid shipments. Because there are no longer many countries that fall outside the global food marketshed, food aid tends to affect recipient country price and trade patterns, and the less well targeted the food aid is to needy, hungry subpopulations, the greater these market disruption effects.
Of course, third-party commercial import displacement naturally leads to trade conflicts and is a primary reason why food aid has become a serious source of conflict within the Doha Development Round negotiations under the WTO, especially between the European Union (EU) and the U.S. The EU contends that much US food aid -especially Title I and monetized non-emergency food aid through Title II and Food for Progressrepresents a disguised farm subsidy program and should be treated as such. The reasons are that (i) the Farm Bill makes trade promotion and surplus disposal explicit objectives of U.S. food aid programs, and (ii) these commodities are sold by recipient governments, NGOs and cooperatives in developing country markets and thus compete directly with commercial imports and domestic producers in these markets. Food aid that augments market-mediated supply must drive down prices, displace commercial sales, or both. Of course, since food aid does not change aggregate supply and represents a small share of total food trade volumes, these displacement effects, although real, can be seriously exaggerated. The main risk in the WTO negotiations is that over-reactions to the nowsmall share of food aid ineffectively used for trade promotion purposes threaten the majority of food aid that is used effectively for humanitarian response and legitimate, well-targeted development interventions.
C. The Dramatic Shift from Program to Emergency Food Aid
What was initially a program based on government-to-government concessional sales on 
D. Reduced Cash Resources for Food Security Programming in Developing Countries
Steady improvement in early warning systems, emergency needs assessment methods and operational agencies' supply chain management and recipient targeting over the past twenty years have enhanced the efficacy of emergency food aid in stemming injurious response to crises (e.g., distress sales of productive assets by the poor) and in sustaining recipients' nutritional status and health. This has elicited increased emergency food aid.
Although the same tools enhance the performance of non-emergency food aid programs, funds for development purposes have nonetheless decreased sharply over the past twenty years, especially that channeled through developing country governments. This simply reflects that emergencies are the first-best uses of food aid. As reflected in Figure 3 , overall food aid program appropriations are down 46.4% in inflation-adjusted terms since 1980. Other food aid donors' trends are similar. This reflects gradual realization that cash for development assistance often yields better returns than commodities do. Even as real overseas development assistance spending has increased in the United States in recent years, food aid appropriations and physical tonnage has decreased.
As a consequence, the big challenge facing the operational agencies handling food aid today is that available resources do not come close to meeting the demands they face.
Despite repeated global commitments to reduce hunger, there has been no change in the number of hungry people in developing countries since 1990 (FAO 2006a) . With more than 820 million people undernourished and perhaps more than double that number suffering micronutrient malnutrition associated within insufficient intake of essential minerals and vitamins, the need for interventions to reduce hunger and poverty -the main cause of chronic hunger and malnutrition -has never been greater.
Not only is food aid funding down by nearly half in real terms since 1980, other government cash resources for medium-to-long-term development programming targeted to advancing food security objectives likewise has grown scarce over the past generation.
Overall development assistance has been climbing again in recent years after falling steadily for most of the 1990s. But funding for interventions aimed at reducing hunger and food insecurity has fallen. Increased cash resource scarcity for development interventions has induced NGOs and cooperatives involved in food aid to adopt more controversial practices.
When the 1990 Farm Bill relaxed rules on NGO and cooperative sales of food aid for local currencies in developing countries -a practice known as "monetization" -and increased the minimum monetization rate for non-emergency Title II programs from 10% to 15%, NGOs and cooperatives began using food commodities as a means to raise scarce cash for food security programming. The intent behind monetization authorization was to help operational agencies defray the very real costs of distributing food and Monetization is controversial for several reasons. First, it is qualitatively similar to program food aid (e.g., Title I), with consequences for import displacement that excite opposition among other WTO member states and sometimes among U.S. commercial exporters, and possible adverse effects on local markets for recipient country producers and traders. Moreover, many observers consider monetization a terribly inefficient way to put tax revenues to work in valuable development programming in low-income countries,
given the large share of expenditures lost to freight, commodity procurement premia and storage and administrative costs. Non-experts readily understand the inefficiencies inherent to using taxpayer dollars to buy food and shipping services, then converting the delivered commodities back into cash. NGOs that were heavily involved in food aid monetization as recently as a few years ago -such as Technoserve and CARE -are therefore reducing or discontinuing monetization as inefficient and often disruptive for recipient country markets.
Monetization is mainly a response to the diminished availability of cash resources for essential non-emergency food security programming. United States foreign assistance has become caught in a "relief trap", with emergency response crowding out longer-term investments to preempt future emergencies, causing a vicious cycle of emergency, relief response and predictable, follow-on emergencies (Barrett and Carter 2002) . Development interventions are as necessary as ever to reduce the likelihood of emergencies. But as the most comprehensive recent study emphasizes, outside of a few special circumstances when monetization is intrinsically valuable as an activity, it is vastly more efficient and effective to replace commodity support for non-emergency development programs via monetization with cash for NGOs and cooperatives to undertake these same activities (Tschirley and Howard 2003) . International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Article 11), and universally reaffirmed at the 1996 World Food Summit in Rome. Food aid can also be a valuable complement to non-food resources in non-emergency settings. When properly targeted to food insecure recipients, food aid is important to protecting the few productive assets the poor own, most especially the health and labor power of adults and children (Quisumbing 2003 , Yamano et al. 2005 . And when it is not only properly targeted to needy individuals but also distributed during periods when need is most acute, food aid can likewise obviate seasonal liquidity constraints that otherwise cause periodic undernutrition and underuse of productive inputs, thereby helping boost productivity on semi-subsistence farms (Bezuneh, Deaton and Norton 1988 , Barrett, Bezuneh and Aboud 2001 , Abdulai, Barrett and Hoddinott 2005 . The return to food aid can thus be quite high, even higher than cash in food deficit areas with poorly functioning agricultural markets.
E. Changed Food Aid Policies Among Operational Agencies and Other Donors
The effectiveness of food aid programming has, if anything, grown with the increased professionalization of development and humanitarian organizations' operations over the past twenty or so years. These changes are driven in large measure by radically improved understanding of the etiology of famine and food insecurity, as well as technological and logistical improvements that have reduced costs and increased flexibility and accuracy.
These changes run the gamut from improved early warning systems and emergency needs assessment methods, to more flexible and efficient supply chain management, better targeting protocols, and increasingly professionalized staffing.
One manifestation of this is the increased attention paid to the nutritional content of commodities distributed. In many cases, bulk grains supplemented by legumes, vegetable oil, or both, suffice to top up the energy and protein intake of target populations to minimal levels. But the use of micronutrient fortified foods has become increasingly widespread due to their importance in emergency feeding, as well as school feeding and maternal and child health programs. Fortified foods -especially therapeutic foods designed for severely malnourished children -are not commonly available through commercial channels in poor communities, and dietary diversity is commonly limited among low-income households, thus serious micronutrient deficiencies are distressingly widespread. Rations designed to meet these needs can work wonders. For example, a recent program evaluation of USAID/Food for Peace Title II programs showed a decline in the prevalence of stunting (low height for age, a measure of chronic malnutrition) of 2.4% per year among targeted participants of programs, with nutritional improvement better than national averages in three-quarters of the programs examined, suggesting that the Title II programs contributed significantly to food security (Swindale et al. 2004 ).
WFP and NGOs' improved focus on assessed recipient need (divorced from the secondary objectives that bedevil government-to-government program food aid) appears to give them comparative advantage in increasing and stabilizing food availability in poor, food-deficit countries and in timely, appropriate response to disasters as well as chronic poverty and food insecurity situations.
3 This helps account for the sharp increase in U.S. food aid channeled through these agencies, as documented previously. Moreover, operational agencies' successes have helped spark significant reforms in many donor countries, notably Australia, Canada and the European Union.
In 1996, the European Union enacted Regulation 1292/96, combining its non-emergency food aid and food security budgets into a consolidated Food Security Budget Line (FSBL) focused on advancing a single goal of improving food security. The FSBL both allowed for more flexible programming between cash and commodities and eliminated restrictions tying procurement of food aid (either commodities or freight services) to European suppliers. This marked a significant departure from past policies and has encouraged increased use of local and regional purchases (in or near the destination developing country) so as to reduce delivery lags, ensure that food aid distributed is suited to local tastes and dietary habits, achieve greater cost-efficiency in food aid procurement and delivery and channel the demand stimulus from food aid procurement so as to benefit developing country farmers. While European food aid has not entirely lived up to this promise, perhaps especially regarding reduced delivery lags, this nonetheless represents a sharp break from traditional food aid reliant entirely on sourcing food in the donor's domestic market. Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom now give almost all their food aid in cash for local and regional purchases by NGOs and WFP.
Perhaps the most dramatic reforms occurred in Denmark, which substantially overhauled its food aid program in the early 1990s, replacing canned meat and processed cheese with bulk basic grains, wheat flour, peas and vegetable oil. As a direct result of these relatively Take away food aid from the U.S., the only major donor that does not permit local and regional purchases, and over 60% of global food aid flows are now procured outside the donor country (WFP 2006) . This is a striking shift in just the past several years. These costs are attributable to the many restrictions placed on food aid, in particular with respect to shipping, bagging, processing. Other donors, operating without those added restrictions, face far lower program costs. For example, in FY2003, the most recent year for which detailed data were available, 68.1% of Canada's food aid budget was spent on commodities, and only 24.6% on total transport costs (overland, ocean and in recipient countries). Even though freight costs within and from Canada to most tropical recipient countries are the same as or greater than comparable costs within and from the United States, the U.S. government spends roughly a 70% larger share of its food aid budget on transport and about 40% less on commodities than Canada does. That means it can feed far fewer hungry people per taxpayer dollar than other donors, signalling significant inefficiencies that limit program effectiveness in achieving the stated food security objectives of U.S. international food assistance programs.
What Remains The
In emergency medicine, the "Golden Hour" is the first 60 minutes after an accident or the onset of acute illness, the window during which the chances for saving a patient and permitting full recovery are greatest. The international humanitarian community has generally internalized the principle of the Golden Hour: Rapid response is essential. Food aid procurement policy nonetheless stands in the way. In 2000, the average delay in delivering emergency food aid -the time between a formal, bureaucratic request and port delivery in the affected country -was nearly five months because current rules require all U.S. food aid to be grown in and shipped from the United States (Barrett and Maxwell 2005) . The same GAO study cited earlier found that had the U.S. authorized regional purchases by WFP -which made regional purchases with 93% of all its non-U.S. funding for Afghanistan during that period -it could have saved 120 days in delivery time for food aid rations (GAO 2003) .
In addition to authorizing each of the food aid programs above, various bills enacted by the Congress, including past Farm Bills, have mandated seven specific restrictions on these programs. In no case are these restrictions driven by the needs of operational agencies to improve effective response to intended recipients' food security needs. And in several cases, these restrictions are mutually incompatible. We explore these restrictions now in turn.
A. Minimum volumes
Under the 2002 Farm Bill, and consistent with the United States' obligations under the international Food Aid Convention, the minimum level of mandated assistance is 2.5 million metric tons (MMT) per year. This minimum has become an issue in recent years as higher costs for freight and some foods (e.g., therapeutic foods for responding to late stage emergencies) and reduced budgets have threatened the programs' ability to meet this minimum. The solution is obvious: increase appropriations for food aid and reduce non-commodity costs in the programs. The former is difficult given current federal budget deficits, however, and the latter arises from a host of different politically-popular restrictions discussed below. Meeting minimum volume requirements is therefore likely to remain challenging for the foreseeable future.
B. Minimum non-emergency volumes
The sub-minimum volume for non-emergency food aid programs was set at 1.875 MMT -75% of the Title II minimum tonnage level -by the 2002 Farm Bill. That minimum has not been met in a single year since 1995 because emergency food aid demands combined with lower real food aid budgets have crowded out spending on non-emergency food aid.
Indeed, the 75-25 implicit non-emergency-to-emergency target ratio in the 2002 Farm
Bill has been turned on its head, with 75% or more of Title II resources going to emergencies in recent years. The USAID Administrator routinely waives this requirement, as permitted in the authorizing legislation, because the Agency is unable to meet the non-emergency minimum, given available resources and emergency demands.
Moreover, since emergency uses are first best for food resources, this prioritization is appropriate. But food commodity resources can be effectively used as complements to cash in non-emergency safety net (e.g., food-for-work employment guarantee schemes) and food-based (e.g., school feeding or maternal and child health) programs. Routine violation of the non-emergency food aid subminimum has created enormous problems for NGOs operating such programs, as resource pipelines are increasingly delayed, disrupted and discontinued.
C. Value-added minimum
The 1985 farm bill established that at least 75 percent of the non-emergency minimum tonnage be fortified, bagged or processed, ensuring demand from the federal government for the services of a modest number of vendors registered with the U.S. government in that industry. Two agribusiness giants alone, Cargill and Archer-Daniels Midland, combined to ship 1.9 million metric tons of food aid in fiscal year 2003, more than onethird of all U.S. food aid shipments that year (Thurow and Kilman 2003) . There is no evidence that U.S. farmers enjoy any gains from the value-added minima and this drives up the cost per nutrient for recipients, helping to account for the high cost of U.S. food aid relative to other donor countries.
In practice, however, this requirement is rarely met because it directly contradicts the sub-minimum requirement for non-emergency tonnage. Because processing costs reduce the tonnage procurable with sharply limited non-emergency food aid budgets, USAID must necessarily choose between these competing mandates. It has typically compromised, failing to meet either restriction.
D. Bagging minimum
Beyond but clearly overlapping with the value-added requirement noted above, the law requires that 50% of Title II non-emergency grain purchases be bagged in the United
States. This adds modestly to costs, but is met in most years. One of the chief beneficiary groups from this restriction is, non-obviously, shippers, for reasons explained below. The shippers' extraordinary political power over food aid programs, manifest especially in cargo preference (see the next sub-section) is the chief reason this subminimum is usually met. There is no underlying economic, humanitarian or nutritional reason why bagging commodities is essential in U.S. food aid programs.
E. Cargo Preference
Shipping restrictions on food aid are especially contentious. Cold War -and broader The existence of two distinct programs to support the maritime industry creates perverse incentives. For example, shippers benefit handsomely from the 1985 farm bill provision mandating that at least 75 percent of the non-emergency minimum tonnage be fortified, bagged or processed and the 50 percent minimum bagging requirement on nonemergency grain shipments because they must surrender subsidies they receive from Maritime Security Program (MSP) on any days that they carry more than 7500 tons of bulk food aid under cargo preference provisions. Since more than three-quarters of vessels in the MSP also carry cargo preference food aid shipments, 4 this is an important opportunity for shipping lines to "double dip" by carrying bagged food aid commodities, thereby collecting both the substantial premia that accrue from the cargo preference restriction and the MSP subsidy of more than $7000/day per vessel. One reason for this is that OFD reimbursement does not apply to vessels that are more than 25 years old -it is only for "militarily useful vessels" -although many older, bulk cargo and break-bulk vessels nonetheless qualify for cargo preference. 6 This difference between vessels eligible for cargo preference and "militarily useful" vessels for which MARAD provides (partial) reimbursement provides windfall gains to a small number of line operators while driving up unreimbursed program costs for USAID and taxpayers.
Yet because food aid volumes are a tiny share of global shipments and most ocean freight is not subject to cargo preference restrictions -cargo preference accounts for only 5-15 percent of U.S.-flagged ships' total containerized cargoes and three-quarters of U.S.-owned ships are now flagged outside the United States -this program cannot realistically keep shipping lines afloat. Moreover, dry bulk ships are of negligible value today to the U.S. military. As a result, the GAO has repeatedly concluded that cargo preference on food aid shipments does not advance the objectives for which it is designed (GAO 1990 (GAO , 1994a (GAO , 1994b (GAO , 1995 Because no CP-eligible carriers service Great Lakes ports today, these restrictions are now met entirely through intermodal cargoes transported overland from the Great Lakes region, then transferred to another means of conveyance (e.g., truck to rail) for movement to another U.S. seaport for export (on a non-U.S. flag carrier). In FY2005, 39% of shipments ran through intermodal plants or bridges -the vast majority of them Great
Lakes locations -thereby adding costly transfer costs to shipments.
F. Monetization
Since the 1990 Farm Bill, the Congress has required that at least 15% of non-emergency food aid be monetized. As described earlier, this minimum has been far exceeded in every year and thus serves as a non-binding constraint on food aid programming currently.
G. Overhead Reimbursement for Operational Agencies
The 2002 Farm Bill also specified that funding for administrative support and internal transport, storage and handling of food aid commodities for NGOs, cooperatives and WFP under PL480 Title II Section 202(e) had to be 5-10% of annual Title II spending.
Although USAID chose only the midpoint of that range (7.5%), this nonetheless represented a more than four-fold increase in 202(e) funding and permitted USAID to broaden the types of expenses to which operational agencies could apply these funds. As previously discussed, food aid has proved ineffective in promoting goals 3 and 4.
And there is nothing specific to food resources that makes food aid especially appropriate for objectives 2, 5 or 6. Historically, food aid has really only proved effective at meeting two objectives: surplus disposal (notably omitted from the current official objectives of U.S. food aid programs) and humanitarian assistance. Since the historical (although not current) surplus disposal objective is unlikely to be permissible under any future WTO agreement, 7 and because diffuse objectives increase costs and lower the effectiveness of U.S. food aid programs, many observers favor focusing the program's objective on a single goal akin to #1 above: to serve humanitarian and development objectives associated with emergency response and advancing food security in low-income countries. Increasingly scarce federal resources makes it that much more important to maximize value per tax dollar. And in non-emergency interventions, food is commonly not the most important resource; cash-based programs are typically less restrictive (one can, after all, purchase food with the cash) and thus yield higher (economic or humanitarian) returns per dollar. NGOs worry, however, that cash for long-term investment in reducing chronic hunger will not be made available if more inefficient uses of food aid are cut off.
B. Food Aid Spending Levels
But the performance of non-emergency food aid is also hampered by the various Congressional restrictions enumerated above, which add to the financial costs of the programs and reduce their effectiveness in responding to and preempting humanitarian emergencies around the world. A major issue in upcoming reauthorization of food aid programs will therefore concern the restrictions that presently add to program costs and impede performance, especially timeliness in deliveries.
C. Procurement and Shipping Restrictions
As described earlier, many of the Congressional mandates on food aid programs routinely go unmet, in some cases because they are mutually inconsistent, in other cases because they are simply infeasible given current budget levels. For this reason, as well as because they drive up costs and reduce the timeliness and cultural and nutritional appropriateness of food aid programs, many observers advocate narrowing the set of restrictions on U.S.
food aid programs. Key candidate mandates for elimination or relaxation include (i) the 75% minimum share of non-emergency food aid fortified, processed or bagged, (ii) the cap on Section 202(e) cash made available to operational agencies to cover administrative and internal transport, storage and handling costs, and (iii) cargo preference requirements.
Because bagging, monetization and overall food aid volume minima rarely if ever constrain U.S. food aid programs, those restrictions are generally thought less germane to policy reform discussions.
The argument for eliminating the value added minimum is simple: this mandates is rarely if ever met, there is little or no prospect of it being met in the foreseeable future, and it has no basis in advancing food security objectives. The 202(e) cash spending cap will need to be lifted if a WTO agreement, Executive Branch policy or (least likely)
Congressional mandate caps non-emergency food aid monetization rates. But because 202(e) is tied to commodity receipts, unless complementary cash resources for development assistance become available through the foreign relations appropriations process, operational agencies will otherwise find it increasingly difficult to implement effective food aid programs as rising transport costs pose an increasing burden.
The big battles, as always, will surround cargo preference restrictions. Now that the Maritime Security Program (MSP), recently re-authorized for another decade, provides a cleaner mechanism for subsidizing the U.S. merchant marine, cargo preference appears ripe for a rollback. In the face of increased freight costs, and given the double dipping in which carriers can legally engage when carrying most food aid shipments, the government could save scarce funds by eliminating cargo preference in favor of a bolstered MSP.
At a minimum, the Congress needs to direct agencies to make two basic reforms. This first would streamline commodity procurement and freight contracting by insisting on use of prevailing best practices in commercial supply logistics so as to improve timeliness of delivery and to reduce expenditures to commercial terms or at least the near-commercial terms enjoyed by other government agencies, such as the Department of Defense.
Second, harmonize the listing of vessels eligible for cargo preference and of "militarily useful" vessels for which MARAD provides (partial) reimbursement to USAID and USDA. The present inconsistency between these listings provides windfall gains to a small number of line operators while driving up unreimbursed program costs and failing to support the national security objectives of the cargo preference provisions. Ending the expensive Great Lakes port provisions could likewise eliminate considerable unnecessary freight costs that have no basis in improving the efficiency or effectiveness of food aid programs.
Savings in freight costs can also be achieved through administrative improvements.
USDA presently uses a cumbersome double bid system, but will soon experiment with a potentially cheaper and quicker, electronic single bid system. Shippers indicate that quicker settlement of charges could likewise save costs, since freight lines must currently wait for payment 30 days after delivery to terminal port, rather than at time of cargo transfer at the load port, as is common in commercial and Department of Defense contracts. Because shippers factor these delays into their freight bids, it drives up costs for food aid programs.
D. Local and Regional Purchases
The issue of relaxing procurement and shipping restrictions leads directly to the most recent big debate about U.S. food aid programs: the prospective use of cash to make local and regional purchases to respond to food emergencies in developing countries. By law, the food provided through U.S. food aid programs must be grown in the United States, processed and shipped from here. This "tying" of food aid to domestic procurement of commodities and shipping services sets the U.S. apart from other donors, who have partly or wholly abandoned the practice. As noted earlier, in 2005 a majority of non-U.S. food aid globally was procured using local and regional purchases.
The economics supporting local and regional purchases are impeccable: quicker, lowercost delivery that is less likely to disrupt recipient country markets (Tschirley 2007 Nonetheless, in its FY2007 and FY2008 budget requests, the Administration made a similar proposal, this time retaining the funds within the PL480 Title II account, but requesting authorization for the USAID Administrator to spend up to 25% of Title II for emergency local and regional procurement of food from low-income countries 9 when those sources could provide food on a more timely and less-expensive basis with adequate quality control and no expected adverse effects on local markets.
Local and regional purchases are not simple nor are they available and effective everywhere. Some markets are too thin to absorb a significant increase in commercial food demand without driving up prices and thereby hurting poor local consumers. In other places, quality control, transport capacity and trader market power concerns limit donor's procurement options. Moreover, even taking freight and administrative costs into account, it is sometimes cheaper to import food aid from the US. For example, Lentz and Barrett (2006) find that 36% of US food aid shipments to Ethiopia, Kenya and Tanzania, 1998-2002 , cost less than comparable local market purchases.
But most often, and on average, local and regional purchases are cheaper and quicker than shipments of American food on U.S. ships halfway around the world. A detailed study of global food aid transactions found that local food aid procurement in developing countries relative to direct transfers from donor countries was 66% less expensive across all commodities, and 61% and 52%, respectively, for maize (corn) and corn-soy blend, the two primary commodities shipped to Africa by U.S. food aid programs (OECD 2005) .
Recent research corroborates those findings over a longer period but a smaller set of (African) recipient countries, arriving at quite similar estimates of average cost savings (Tschirley 2007, Haggblade and Tschirley 2007) . The latter study concludes that by learning from WFP's recent experience with local and regional purchases, USAID could design a highly effective local food aid procurement program.
Cost savings notwithstanding, the Golden Hour principle discussed previously is perhaps the most compelling argument for local and regional purchases. Rapid response saves lives, limits ill health, helps keep children in school, and prevents precipitous, and sometimes irreversible, asset loss by desperately poor people forced into distress sale of their land, livestock or even persons (i.e., debt peonage). Moreover, timely response also reduces costs because the more advanced the emergency, the more carefully tailoredand expensive -rations need to be in order to stem malnutrition-related disease and excess mortality. The cost difference between bulk commodities useful at the outset of an emergency (e.g., in the days immediately following an earthquake or floods) and the therapeutic and supplementary foods needed once the disaster has fully matured (e.g., many months into a severe drought or in areas plagued for years by conflict) is huge, commonly 20-to-50-fold more expensive per ton. In the 2005 crisis in Niger, an unnecessary six month delay in response to a United Nations appeal for assistance drove intervention costs per child from $1 to $80 (Murphy 2005) . Timeliness is therefore crucial not just because it increases the probability of protecting assets and saving lives.
It is also crucial to preserve scarce budgetary resources needed for dealing with the many demands food aid faces.
Furthermore, when food aid arrives late, it fails to deliver promised humanitarian benefits in full and often can prove disruptive to local commercial farming and marketing systems, as when shipments arrive as the next harvest comes in, so that food aid exacerbates rather than stabilizes volatility in local food supplies. The historical statistical evidence suggests this has been a distressingly common phenomenon with respect to U.S. food aid shipments, with scant improvement in recent years, important and oft-discussed counter-examples not withstanding.
USAID has made notable efforts to improve timely response, through creative rerouting of cargo already at sea 10 and, most notably, through establishing pre-positioning warehouses in Dubai, nearer some regions (e.g., Horn of Africa) where emergencies frequently arise, in Lake Charles, Louisiana, and most recently in Djibouti. While this can, in principle, cut response time to two to four weeks, from the four-plus months averaged by US emergency food aid, the volume and variety of commodities available are sharply limited. Further, maintaining this capacity adds to overall program costs, in part because neither of the original two facilities has the capacity for direct loading of the container ships that increasing carry food aid shipments; so intermodal expenses are significant. Thus, the ability to improve timeliness and efficiency of emergency response are sharply limited within the present confines of complete "buy America" provisions.
Hence the growing chorus of support for at least pilot programs to permit local and regional purchases of food aid based on cash appropriations to USAID.
E. Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust
The Bill Emerson Humanitarian Trust was created after President Carter imposed an embargo on the Soviet Union in 1980 to protest the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
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The embargo voided several large commercial shipments of American wheat to the Soviet Union. CCC offered to purchase the 4 MMT of wheat U.S. suppliers had committed for sale to the Soviet Union. Lacking spare public storage capacity, the federal government not only bought the grain, it then paid the agribusinesses to hold the stocks. Over the ensuing months, the government gradually liquidated much of these stocks, in many cases selling the grains back to the original exporter at a sharp discount.
But the precedent was established. Rather than creating a fund for global food security, as had been advocated in the Congress prior to the 1980 grain embargo on the Soviet Union -and proposed by several subsequent Administrations, including the current oneagribusinesses succeeded in establishing a government grain reserve.
The agribusinesses paid to hold Trust reserves and wheat interests concerned that releases from the Trust could depress prices have historically been successful in minimizing releases from this facility. The only commodity ever held in the BEHT has been wheat, even though other commodities (corn, rice, sorghum) have been authorized since the 1986 Farm Bill. The 1996 Farm Bill also allowed, for the first time, domestic sales of grain held by the Emerson Trust to raise funds to procure processed and fortified products (e.g., vegetable oil, nonfat dry milk powder).
The changing global environment has placed new pressures on the Trust, however. commodity reserves would provide near-term augmentation of PL 480 appropriations while reducing government storage payments. In the medium-term, this would offer a fast-disbursing Famine Fund that could be used to finance local and regional purchases, to pay the premia associated with index insurance contracts that pay out in the event of a major climate shock (e.g., drought or flood), 13 or for other cash-based pilot ventures in addressing emergency food needs in developing countries.
F. Monetization
Taxpayer dollars spent to buy food in the United States, ship it abroad, where an NGO or cooperative accepts the shipment and then sells the food, is tremendously inefficient.
NGOs and cooperatives know this and defend monetization typically on the grounds that cash resources for important development programming overseas simply are not available from the government; inefficient resources are better than no resources, they argue. To a certain degree, therefore, debates about monetization reflect a misplaced debate over appropriate funding levels for development assistance. In the event of a WTO agreement, however, disciplines imposed under new trade rules may force explicit limits on monetization rates. The EU and several other WTO members have been pressing hard on monetization as a de facto export subsidy and it remains to be seen how this particular issue settles out as -and if -negotiations proceed. his keynote address that "we must push ourselves to identify policy and operational changes to make food aid a more effective tool for reducing poverty and hunger. We must not shy away from those changes."
G. Program Consolidation
Food aid remains an important policy instrument today, but much has changed in the world of food aid and these changes drive growing pressures for substantive reforms of U.S. food aid programs that have remained largely unchanged for 15 or more years.
Government-held surpluses are gone, there now exist better ways to assist the merchant 14 The House International Relations Committee presently has joint responsibility with the Agriculture Committee for PL480 Title II.
marine than through cargo preference, the rest of the world has moved sharply towards local and regional purchases as a superior means of delivering adequate and appropriate food on a timely and cost-effective basis, and demand for and skill in emergency response have both increased sharply over the years. Part of the obstacle in contemporary debates about food aid -whether in WTO ministerials or in the halls of Congress -is that many people have failed to notice these striking and crucial changes.
As recognition of the changed landscape for food aid spreads, any of a range of credible reform proposals are likely to enjoy growing support.
The most sensible design would be a simplified, two title arrangement -one for emergency response, one for non-emergency interventions -managed by a single agency with a clear, focused exclusively on addressing global food security. Each title would combine commodities with cash resources, with scaled back or eliminated mandates restricting the composition and sourcing of commodities and freight services, in order to ensure the necessary flexibility to tailor programs to the situation to which the US government is responding. Further, more rigorous Congressional oversight will be necessary to reduce mismanagement that inflates costs and reduces the timeliness and quality of shipments. Given the small share of farm and shipper revenues that come from food aid programs, the cost of these reforms would be negligible while the benefits to the United States from improved response to humanitarian disasters and chronic food insecurity would be considerable. Indeed, if restrictions that impede efficiency and timeliness can be lifted, improved performance of U.S. food aid programs may justify increased real appropriations. By contrast, smaller food aid programs are likely and appropriate without substantive reforms to eliminate, or at least sharply reduce and simplify, the complex web of procurement restrictions and bureaucratic duplication that currently make rapid response to humanitarian crises unnecessarily difficult and U.S.
programs far more expensive per beneficiary than other donors' food aid programs. The time is ripe for food aid reform in Washington.
